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Can Audit (still) be Trusted?  
 
 
Abstract  
This paper analyses audit as an exemplar of an expert system. The paper explores the 
premise that systemic trust in audit has been damaged and requires repair, looking 
specifically at the role of the institutionalised mechanism of the public inquiry. This is 
examined empirically in relation to the interaction between the Heads of the Big Four 
accounting firms in the UK and the House of Lords Economic Select Committee in the course 
of the recent parliamentary investigation into the UK Audit market, prompted by the global 
financial crisis. In particular, the paper seeks to understand how there can be transfer of 
trust, following Sztompka (1999), between different levels and between agents in a system. 
In this case, the Big Four - as privileged market participants - require re-legitimation from 
agents that are part of the political and legal apparatus. We therefore argue that re-
legitimation of the Big Four’s privileged market position is dependent on transfer of trust.  
Key words: trust, accountability, audit, expert systems, Big Four, financial crisis, transfer of 
trust. 
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Can Audit (still) be trusted? 
 
“Audits of various sorts come to replace the trust that social government 
invested in professional wisdom and the decisions and actions of specialists.” 
(Miller & Rose, 2008: 110) 
 “Financial magicians went from being the objects of public envy to the targets 
of universal contempt. Politicians became exposed as corrupt and as liars. 
Governments were denounced. Media were suspected. Trust vanished. And 
trust is what glues together society, the market, the institutions. Without trust, 
nothing works. Without trust, the social contract dissolves and people 
disappear as they transform into defensive individuals fighting for survival”. 
(Castells, 2013: 1) 
 
Introduction 
Since 2008, governments, international agencies and the media have sought to 
understand the causes of the financial crisis and establish ‘who is to blame’ (Davies, 2010). 
Integral to this process has been an ebbing away of trust in a broad spectrum of actors 
across the global financial system (Gillespie et. al., 2012; Stiglitz, 2012; Rajan, 2010). This 
extended in due course to asking critical questions of the Big Four accounting firms that 
audited the accounts of the major financial institutions that failed. The mistrust pandemic 
that has engulfed the financial system taps into a broader erosion of trust in institutions 
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found across contemporary society (Misztal, 1996: 3), especially during the last twenty years 
or so (Kouzes & Posner, 2011: Ch.1). The research question driving this paper is: how does 
the expert system of audit justify itself in the light of apparent failure and ensure that, 
institutionally, audit can still be trusted? We address this question through an analysis of the 
interrogation and testimony of UK managing partners of the four major accounting firms – 
the ‘Big Four’ - in a 2010 House of Lords inquiry into the British audit market. The central 
contribution of this study is to explore extant understandings of trust repair (Dietz & 
Gillespie, 2012; Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011; Sztompka, 1999; Kramer & Cook, 2004). 
Secondarily, the study draws on and contributes to the literature on expert systems and 
trust (Barrett et al, 2005; Barrett and Gendron, 2006; Fogarty et al, 2006; Free 2008; Jeacle 
& Carter, 2011) and audit failure (Humphrey et al., 2009; Arnold & Sikka, 2001; Power, 1997; 
Thornburg & Roberts, 2008) respectively. Our approach is a sociological one, which aims to 
contribute towards an empirically informed analysis of audit, trust and the role of the public 
inquiry.   
Outside of academic concerns on trust, this paper resonates, more generally, with 
the crisis of trust that many institutions currently face. The number of crises and scandals 
during say the last fifteen years has “assaulted our conﬁdence in the trustworthiness of the 
organizational systems on which we rely.” (Kramer & Cook, 2004: 2; cf. Eilifsen & Willekens, 
2008: 2-3) The period in which the Lords inquiry took place is perhaps significant for 
understanding the dataset we draw upon. It followed “a deepening crisis of public trust” 
(O’Neill, 2002: 8), which in the context of the UK comprised of a scandal over parliamentary 
expenses, a melt-down in the banking sector, and a phone hacking scandal in the media (see 
Dietz & Gillespie, 2012). These scandals occurred in a context whereby the framing of news, 
for instance, by emphasizing negative actor traits, was overwhelmingly hostile and 
implicated the media in growing cynicism or distrust among the public (Cappella & Jamieson, 
1997; Kramer, 2006: 9). An illustration of the ‘mistrust pandemic’ was the public debate at 
the 2013 Edinburgh International Book Festival: chaired by Gavin Esler, a highly respected 
BBC journalist, a series of events took place under the header “The Collapse of Trust” with 
individual sessions focusing on “Can we trust the media?”, “Can we trust each other?”, “Can 
we trust the government?”, “Can we trust the economists?”  
Related concepts of trust, mistrust and the repair of trust go to the heart of the 
zeitgeist. In the aftermath of the Wikileaks affair, serious questions of data security and 
privacy, involving Google and other Internet firms, have fuelled major discussions around 
the extent to which citizens across the world are able to trust their political and corporate 
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leaders. The ‘mistrust pandemic’ is internationalist in its orientation and serious questions of 
trust in contemporary markets, institutions and society have been debated widely, including 
in the U.S. (eg Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Lounsbury & Hirsch, 2010; Kouzes & Posner, 
2011; Bohnet et al., 2012), Germany (Gehrig, 2013; Rosenberger & Seeber, 2013), as well as 
globally (eg Castells, 2013).  
In the U.K., wave upon wave of scandals, ranging from the autism scare, phone 
hacking, patient neglect in NHS hospitals, Westminster MPs’ expenses, encourages us to ask 
whether the traditionally respected professions still deserve or have in fact lost our trust.  
This sensibility is reflected in publications asking whether we can trust the BBC (Aitken, 
2008, 2013), trust the media (Monck & Hanley, 2008), trust our leaders (Kouzes & Posner, 
2011; Krastev, 2013), trust our fellow citizens, and whether “a revolution in accountability 
(can) remedy our ‘crisis of trust’?” (O’Neill, 2002: 4) In the wake of this general ‘crisis of 
trust’, as well as the 2008- financial crisis, the expert system of audit was thus at risk from its 
critics (Sikka, 2009). Therefore, we commend trust as a central concept to organization 
theory as it seeks to understand contemporary organizations. 
The current crisis in trust is focused not only on certain high profile individuals, but 
extends to organizations and institutions: firmaments of the establishment that have been 
undermined by scandal. While individuals – such as high profile bankers - might be 
scapegoated for their failings and blamed for the collapse of their organizations, the crisis in 
trust goes much further: it strikes at the heart of ‘expert systems’, which Barrett et al. (2005, 
p. 19), in their study of large accounting firms, note “facilitate standardization across 
contexts and provide a key coordinating function”. We argue that expert systems embody 
“abstract trust in the organizational regimes of coordination, supervision, or leadership that 
safeguard smooth cooperation” (Sztompka, 1999: 63). We seek to show how the 
trustworthiness of the Big Four accounting firms’ expert systems can be reaffirmed or 
(further) undermined at one critical juncture, namely the testimony at a Parliamentary Select 
Committee inquiry. For this purpose, we utilize Sztompka’s (1999: 46-51; 2000; 2003; 2007) 
sociological theory of the transfer of trust. Thus, in this paper we develop an existing 
sociological theory, but transport it into a new field, namely organization and management 
theory. The application of Sztompka’s work enables us to enhance our existing 
understanding of testimony and audit.  
 
Trust, Institutions and Expert Systems 
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The serious loss of trust in major institutions, expert systems and organizations is anticipated 
and reflected in the extant organization theory literature on trust (Bachmann & Inkpen, 
2011; Kouzes & Posner, 2011: Ch.1; Kramer & Cook, 2004; Misztal, 1996: 3; Kramer & 
Pittinsky, 2012). Institution-based trust (Zucker, 1986) is distinct from more inter-personal 
and community-based forms of trust: “Institution-based trust means that one believes the 
necessary impersonal structures are in place to enable one to act in anticipation of a 
successful future endeavour” (McKnight et al., 1998/2006: 119). Impersonal structures 
resonate closely with expert systems, such as auditing. It also extends to include legal 
regulations, professional codes of conduct, corporate reputation, employment contracts and 
others (Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011). In contrast to trust relying on personal interactions 
(Mayer et al, 1995; Hosmer, 1995: 398), expert systems are premised on systems trust 
(Giddens, 1990; Luhmann, 1979), which rely on a ‘leap of faith’ that the expert systems will 
perform as we expect them to (Nandkumar, 1999: 47; Möllering, 2001: 404). Specifically, we 
cannot know for sure, or check comprehensively, that all the audits that get done, are 
performed competently and with integrity – hence we need to have faith that they will. 
Following Giddens (1990: 34-5) and Sztompka (1999: 29-40), the converse of trust is risk: the 
potentiality of unexpected and adverse outcomes. If audit, as an expert system, is judged as 
too risky in its present format, then ‘too much trust’ is required to keep it going: “trust 
transforms uncertainty into risk … Where there is no risk, trust cannot exist, nor is it 
needed.” (Bachmann, 2006: 395)  
It is possible to distinguish four bases of trust: “One can trust individuals, 
organisations, institutions and systems.” (Noteboom, 2012: 9) Lane (1998: 14-19) 
distinguishes between micro-level, institutional, system and societal trust. Similarly, 
Banerjee et al. (2006: 305-6) identify three levels, but with cross-combinations, and this 
results in nine types of trust relationships, as trust may take place between entities at the 
same level (individual, organizational, societal), or between entities at different levels. 
Hence, they introduce the concept of the ‘pyramid of trust’ that spans different levels: I may 
trust a pianist because I know that she graduated from an esteemed piano school, was 
favourably reviewed in a newspaper, which I value highly, and the recordings are produced 
by a music company which I trust (and so on). The notion of trust transfer is related to this 
‘pyramid of trust’ (Sztompka, 1999: 47). It is noteworthy that audit functions at all levels: 
from the inter-personal interactions between a client and auditor (Anderson-Gough et al., 
2000), to the societal- or institutional-level trust that society places in auditors (Power, 
1997) to ensure, for instance, the effective functioning of stock market trading. Whilst we 
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can trust organizations, organizations themselves cannot trust “because it is individuals as 
members of organizations, rather than the organizations themselves, who trust.” (Zaheer et 
al., 1998: 141) Sztompka (1999: 46) concurs, arguing that “we ultimately trust human 
actions” – for example, if we trust the members of a parliamentary committee to be both 
competent, impartial and act with integrity, then we are more likely to trust the functioning 
of the system that the Committee was charged with investigating. In this sense, trust 
’travels’ or can be transferred. When trust has broken down, ethical doubts may find their 
expression in critical questioning, directed at so-called ‘bridge concepts’, or problematic 
concepts, such as ‘conflict of interests’ or ‘fairness’ (Banerjee et al., 2006: 304). Thus, clients 
may critically interrogate professionals, or members of Committees may critically 
interrogate partners, who appear at the testimony to defend both the organization but also 
the profession.  
Finally, organizational level trust in the competence and integrity, but not necessarily 
benevolence, of the Big Four is a necessary precondition for us to provide a restrictive 
oligopoly to a few select market operators. We conceive of audit as both an institution and 
an expert system: for the purposes of this paper, we will not distinguish therefore between 
system and institutional trust (Bachmann, 2006: 398) – indeed, we follow Barber (1983: 18) 
who argued that abstract systems are rooted in societal (legal, political, educational) 
institutions and, therefore trusting a system means trusting the corresponding institution(s).  
 
Trust in the Audit System before and since the Global Financial Crisis 
Audit is designed to ensure trust by providing “professionally structured and 
independent information to a variety of actors in the accountability process.” (White & 
Hollingsworth, 1999: 9) In the UK, “(w)hen the accounting process has been completed, an 
external audit evaluates and reports on the accuracy of the account. This is the second 
stage, and a separate stage, in the process to hold to account those responsible for the 
management of an organization’s finance.” (ibid. p.25) Building on this definition, we 
conceive of the expert system deployed by the Big Four firms as stretching across time, 
through the provision of judgements on the past (audit) and future (capital investment 
plans, tax planning, consulting), and stretching across space: both through the use of 
‘immutable mobiles’ (e.g. numbers) (Briers & Chua, 2001), to translate dispersed 
organizational activities (e.g. multiple client locations) into a single entity (i.e. the audit 
report), and through the globalised presence of the Big Four across the world. However, we 
argue that during crucial performances at field-configuring events (McInerney, 2008), such 
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as public inquiries, person-based interactions can be decisive for de-stabilizing or re-
stabilizing institutionalised (systems of) trust.  
The 2010 British House of Lords inquiry into the Big Four Audit Firms is but one such 
instance. The inquiry looked into the Big Four’s role in the Global Financial Crisis and 
assessed whether audit firms could be trusted with regard to their competence and their 
integrity – because audit quality typically refers to the ability of the auditor to detect 
misstatements and willingness to include this in the audit report (Eilifsen & Willekens, 2008: 
3), in spite of the fact that the client is also their paymaster. One issue at stake was the 
question over whether insufficient regulation played a major part in bringing about the 
financial crisis (Gamble, 2009: 7; Crouch, 2011: 163; Engelen et al., 2012). For neo-liberal 
free markets to work, the markets need to be able to trust the information produced by 
market participants (Casey, 2011; Stiglitz, 2010), such as the financial statements of 
companies (as ratified by auditors) and the ratings of debt (as ratified by credit rating 
agencies) (Rona-Tas & Hiss, 2010; Crotty, 2009; Goodhart, 2008; Campbell, 2010: 385; Holm 
& Zaman, 2012). A systemic financial crash intensifies scrutiny of such information-ratifying 
organizations. Auditors, some suggested, failed in their very duty to remain independent, 
place public interest above commercial interests and undertake their duties competently, 
objectively and prudently (Sikka, 2009).   
The collapse in trust in many of the key actors of the international financial system 
resonates with a long standing scepticism within the accounting literature towards the 
conduct of the Big Four (Mitchell et al, 1998; McMillan, 2004; Fogarty et al., 2009), especially 
in the light of previous corporate failures – from Arthur Andersen, DeLorean Motor Cars, 
BCCI, Enron, Parmalat, to WorldCom (e.g. Aruñada, 2004). Germany experienced their own 
set of perceived audit failures, which affected the companies Balsam, Schneider, Holzmann, 
Flowtex, and Comroad, but, overall, “(t)he effect on trust in the audit profession and hence 
the audit itself ... is hard to determine.” (Köhler et al., 2008: 112, 136-7) While the recent 
banking crisis is on a vastly greater scale than previous crises and corporate failures, it 
reprises longstanding concerns about auditor independence, audit quality and conflicts of 
interest (Sikka, 2008; 2009).  It is worth recalling that a decade ago Arthur Andersen’s 
association with the collapse of Enron was to undermine trust not only in Arthur Andersen, 
but in the expert systems employed by the Big Five (as they were then known) and the 
institution of audit more generally (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2004). The legislative corollary of 
the Enron crisis was the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which marked the biggest 
statutory intervention in the US capital markets and accounting profession since the 1930s 
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(Fogarty et al, 2006); this illustrates that where institutionalised trust breaks down, new 
forms of regulation and state intervention may well have to follow (Bachmann, 2001/6: 462-
3; Gillespie et. al., 2012). As such, “audit quality is not just a mere technical phenomenon, 
but is also part of the rhetoric employed by regulators, professional bodies and audit ﬁrms in 
the aftermath of corporate failures and resulting lack of trust in auditing.” (Holm & Zaman, 
2012: 59) Thus, in the run-up to the Select Committee meetings there has clearly been a 
discursive contest surrounding audit, audit quality and the audit firms. Indeed, even before 
any testimony was given, the Select Committee was, reportedly, “unimpressed by the 
profession’s current performance.” (Chambers, 2011: 5)  
Power (1997: 125) argues that assertions as to what audit is not (say insurance or 
certification) have “contributed to a loss of confidence in what is really being said by 
financial auditors.” Indeed, it is noteworthy that accounting irregularities are rarely 
uncovered by auditors, more often than not they are revealed by financial journalists or 
whistle-blowers. Yet, when irregularities are uncovered, it is almost always the auditors that 
find themselves in the spotlight. Shore and Wright (2000: 77) argued that “(a)udit 
encourages the displacement of a system based on autonomy and trust by one based on 
visibility and coercive accountability.” Shapiro (1987: 635) analysed auditors as an example 
of the institutionalization of distrust: auditors can be viewed as agents who control other 
agents, i.e. the management board, on behalf of principals (owners, shareholders). Both 
Power and Shapiro identify an ‘inflationary spiral’ (Shapiro, 1987: 652) where those 
appointed by us, because we distrust, in turn require our trust. It is systematic distrust in the 
accuracy of financial records produced by a company that leads to the perceived need for 
auditors, who in turn rely on our trust that their inspection of the company is accurate, 
reliable, objective, and conducted with integrity. Thus, “(t)he new accountability culture 
aims at ever more perfect administrative control of institutional and professional life.” 
(O’Neill, 2002: 46) 
If, for Power (1994: 13; 1997: 123) and Sztompka (1999: 146), audit is a form of 
latent distrust and yet for its normal operation it is predicated on trust, we similarly suggest 
that forms of political governance following a breakdown in trust – such as the 
parliamentary inquiry we analyse - might remove our temporary distrust but only insofar as 
we trust in the effectiveness and integrity of the political system of inquiry, scrutiny, 
representation and reform itself.  
A professional license to practice is, as with diplomas, accreditations, academic 
titles, and other such symbols of trust, an example of an “encapsulated credential” which 
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allows us to “consider the target trustworthy without considering any other cues.” 
(Sztompka, 1999: 73) However, we know little about what happens when these symbols of 
trust are no longer fully functional. As Bachmann (2001/6: 463) points out, “it could be 
argued that the absence of strong forms of system trust at least results in greater awareness 
of the development of personal trust”. Building on Bachman’s point, we argue that at crucial 
junctures or ‘field configuring events’ (McInerney, 2008), trust is built up at interactional 
level: “’Interactional trust’ rests on social actors’ reliability, integrity and communicative 
skills and does in principle not need powerful institutional arrangements to be developed 
effectively.” (Bachmann, 2006: 398) Indeed, in our case we aim to show that the political 
inquiry is an institutionalised and ritualised process of trust problematisation and 
(potentially) restoration based on interactional performances. 
A central focus for our theoretical contribution is Sztompka’s (1999: 46-51) theory of 
transfer of (dis)trust: for example, widespread distrust in certain politicians may spread to 
the offices they occupy, it may extend  to the government and eventually perhaps to the 
political regime as a whole – a spiral of distrust that we discussed earlier. Similarly, ‘agencies 
of accountability’ (ibid., p.47) including the parliamentary committee we examine, are 
potential pillars for the objects of our primary trust, in this case audit. There can be a 
positive cycle of transfer of trust (where political representatives sanction an institution as 
trustworthy); there can also be a negative cycle of transfer of distrust (where political 
representatives sanction an institution as untrustworthy and create further regulation and 
intervention aimed at restoring trust). In summary, we suggest viewing inquiries as 
institutionalised rituals (Meyer & Rowan, 1983; Brown, 2000) that attempt to scrutinise, 
interrogate, and ultimately repair trust by, in our case, providing renewed legitimacy to the 
institution of audit. This is the precise point where we adapt and develop existing 
sociological theory: we argue that inquiries are rituals pertaining to government and 
regulation, and consequently they constitute a very different type of repair mechanism 
compared to organization-level or corporate trust repair episodes covered in the extant trust 
literature (Dietz & Gillespie, 2012).  
 
Audit, Markets and Socio-Political Settlements 
Why, then, are the State and associated regulatory bodies important for trust in the audit 
system?  One of the central contributions of economic sociology lies in its explication of the 
socio-political embedding of markets (Polanyi, 1944/2001; Swedberg, 1997; Blyth, 2002; 
Mackenzie, 2009; Lounsbury & Hirsch, 2010). These insights allow us to understand how the 
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audit market has been created by particular national political settlements: by this we mean 
that certain firms are permitted to operate within an oligopolistic market structure in 
exchange for their assurances of ‘professional’ conduct. This settlement means that 
professional service firms are entrusted with certain market privileges, such as restrictions 
on competition or absence of mandatory tendering, insofar as they are trusted not to abuse 
these privileges for self-interested commercial gain (Reed, 1996). Audit and the audit market 
are reliant on a socio-political warrant and jurisdiction, including privileges being granted to 
professions at national level (Humphrey et al. 2009). While the neo-liberal project, which is 
of a global nature (Harvey, 2006), proclaims that market relations can and should be freed, 
i.e. separated, from social and political relations (Friedman, 1962), in moments of crisis the 
socio-political sub-structure becomes the very resource of trust-restoration (Polanyi, 
1944/2001). The question for us in this paper is: to what extent can the political system 
restore our trust in the institutionalised system of audit? If it can do this, how does this take 
place?  
Following Bachmann and Inkpen’s (2011) argument, we argue that an unconvincing 
testimonial performance at the committee could undermine confidence and trust in the 
institution of audit (i.e. systems trust), as well as the Big Four (i.e. organizational trust); 
conversely, the ritualised display of a tough interrogation followed by convincing responses 
could result in a transfer of trust from a trusted institution, such as a parliamentary 
committee, to the Big Four. ‘Transference’ of trust means that the trustor draws on proof 
sources from which trust is transferred to a target (Doney et al., 1998: 606). Specific ‘ritual’ 
performances-as-interactions are thus crucially linked to the repair of potentially damaged 
trust at organizational and institutional (system) level. As Sztompka (1999: 46) argued, “(w)e 
ultimately trust human actions, and derivatively their effects, or products. Thus, in the case 
of systemic trust, we expect beneficial actions of … the agents of various institutions and 
organizations, making up the fabric of our society.” Sztompka’s (2007) analysis of trust in 
‘science’ is particularly relevant here, given the parallels with notions of ‘professionalism’: 
‘What we ultimately trust is the performance of these roles: competent, fair and honest, 
rational and critical, disinterested and innovative. Thus ultimately, in all these cases, ‘trust in 
science’ may be reduced to the trust in the actions of scholars, researchers, organizers of 
science, together making up the scientific community.’ (ibid. p.213) We will now turn to an 
overview of the context of our study. 
  
Background and Context 
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Our study analyses the testimony of the Big Four in the UK as part of the House of 
Lords Economic Committee’s investigation of the UK Audit market. The British Parliamentary 
System is bicameral, comprising of the House of Commons and the House of Lords. The 
former is an elected chamber, the latter is appointed with a small proportion of hereditary 
Lords also being members. Each house has a number of Select Committees that scrutinise 
important issues of the day (Ryle, 1997). The Select Committee System was introduced in 
1979 following a ‘fierce debate’ (Hindmoor et al, 2009: 86) concerning the primacy of 
parliament: those advocating the Select Committee system argued that it was an important 
means of scrutinising government; the critics felt it was shifting discussion away from the 
parliamentary debating chamber and thus undermining parliament. As a result of the 1979 
reforms, the ‘power and scope of Committee inquiries were considerably strengthened and 
extended, especially with regard to the provision of information, the attendance of 
witnesses and the production of records and papers’ (Nixon, 1986: 416).  
The House of Lords committees are, in contrast to those in the Commons, organized 
on broad ‘topical lines’ rather than scrutinising individual government departments; the 
corollary is that their inquiries are generally more broad-ranging than those in the House of 
Commons: “Lords Select Committees do not shadow the work of government departments. 
Their investigations look into specialist subjects, taking advantage of the Lords’ expertise 
and greater amount of time (compared to MPs) available to them to examine issues”.1 The 
Economic Affairs Select Committee comprises of Lords with considerable financial expertise, 
with the Committee being composed of members drawn from the elite of the financial 
establishment who have a detailed understanding of economic affairs. Members have 
included former Treasury Ministers (Chancellor of the Exchequer, Chief Secretary to the 
Treasury), former Government Ministers, a former Deputy Chairman of JP Morgan, a Deputy 
Chair of the Competition Commission, and a senior financier and a well-known financial 
journalist.  
Committees are commissioned to write reports into specific issues: ‘They receive 
written submissions from interested groups or individuals, compel them if necessary to 
attend oral evidence hearings where committee members can interrogate them, and require 
relevant documents to be made available’ (Hindmoor et al, 2009:  71) The oral evidence 
hearings are televised and these recordings (and transcriptions) are readily available to the 
public. Hearings on some issues are high profile affairs and conducted in an adversarial 
                                                          
1
 Source: http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/committees/select/ 
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manner; the cross-examination of Rupert Murdoch and his son, James, in July 2011, during 
the phone hacking inquiry is a good example of this process.  
Select Committees attempt, wherever possible, to produce reports unanimously 
agreed by members of the Select Committee, avoiding split reports along partisan lines.  
Government is obliged to respond to the report within three months of receipt; it is not, 
however, under any requirement to accept or evaluate the recommendations (Hindmoor et 
al, 2009: 72). While Select Committees have limited powers - they are unable to initiate, 
amend or reject legislation, nor can they insist that an issue is debated in parliament – they 
are held to serve an important function in Parliament (Hansard, 2001; Rodgers and Walters, 
2006). Certainly, some former Government Ministers note (Mullin, 2009) that they seemed 
to exercise far more influence as a Chair of a Select Committee than as a junior minister. In 
an interview we conducted with a former MP, who had chaired a Commons Select 
Committee, the interviewee stated that his committee work gave him ‘a fair bit of influence, 
certainly more than when a minister’2. The Lords Committees, according to our interviewee, 
were highly regarded because of their expertise and had more time to investigate issues.  
 The difficulty of assessing the concrete impact of Select Committees on policy is 
compounded by the fact that very few of the reports produced by the bodies are actively 
debated in Parliament, even less result in legislative changes. In spite of this, the widely 
accepted view is that Select Committees play a ‘valuable function within the political system’ 
(Hindmoor et al, 2009: 86), suggesting that influence within Parliament works perhaps more 
in way of ‘agenda setting’. It is almost certainly the case that this agenda-setting, 
consciousness-raising role is where Select Committees record their biggest impact – the 
Culture and Media Select Committee’s inquiry in 2011 and the subsequent Leveson Inquiry 
being a good example.  
In outlining the rationale for the audit inquiry during a press conference, Lord 
McGregor explained the ‘problem’ with the audit market (‘dominated by a very small 
number of players’) and also framed the nature of the proposed ‘solution’ (‘promoting more 
competition’). The Big Four audit firms, he claimed, failed to pick up on ‘unsustainable risks’ 
being taken by the financial sector. The aim of the report emanating from the inquiry, he 
concludes, is to provide ‘better services to business and investors’. The committee invited 
evidence to be submitted to the committee by the 27th of September 2010 that related to 
the following questions:  
 
                                                          
2
 Interview, August 21st, 2013, Edinburgh, Scotland. 
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 “How has auditing come to be dominated by four global firms? Should more 
competition be introduced? And if so how? 
 Does a lack of competition lead to excessive fees being charged? 
 Were auditors sufficiently sceptical when auditing banks in the run up to the 
financial crisis in 2008? Could they have done anything to mitigate the crisis? 
Can auditors now contribute to better regulation of banks? 
 Do conflicts of interest arise between audit and consultancy roles? How can 
these be avoided or mitigated?  
 Should the role of internal auditors be enhanced and how should they 
interact with external auditors?”3 
 
While our paper focuses exclusively on the hearing conducted on the 23rd November 
2010, our knowledge of the other hearings and written submissions also informed our 
analysis and certain extracts from these other hearings will be cited selectively. The 
questioners and witnesses involved in the hearing we analyse are listed in Table 1. Prior to 
this meeting, a number of strong critiques of the Big Four had been made by other 
witnesses. While these are not the focus of our analysis here, this evidence is also available 
for interested readers4.  
 
---- Insert Table 1 around here ---- 
    
Given the tight focus of our paper on a specific hearing, it needs to be acknowledged 
that our paper is limited in its knowledge claims, similar to other interpretive work. In 
Brown’s (2000: 50) well-chosen words, “this paper is an artful product designed not just to 
inform but to persuade …” – indeed, and this means that we cannot engage in debates over 
how representative the chosen day of testimony or extracts are. Our knowledge claim is 
based on theoretical and internal validity not generalizability.    
 
                                                          
3 Twenty-one written submissions were also made to the inquiry, ranging from letters from private citizens, academics, Baker 
Tilly accounting firm, the California Public Employees Retirement System, International Audit and Assurance Standards Board, 
UK Shareholders Association and Corporate Value Associates. In total the Economics committee asked 553 questions, which 
were transcribed and made available on the House of Lords website. The sessions were also broadcast live on Parliament TV. 
On the 30th of March the Economics Affairs Committee published their report.   See: 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/economic-affairs-committee/inquiries/auditors-
market-concentration-and-their-role/ 
 
4
 http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/economic-affairs-
committee/inquiries/auditors-market-concentration-and-their-role/ 
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Research analytics 
Our analysis is underpinned by the principle that legitimising accounts play a crucial role in 
the micro-institutional work that underpins the continued legitimacy (or otherwise) of a 
field, which underpins the trust that social actors place in institutions (Vaara & Monin, 2010; 
Holm & Zaman, 2012). For example, an appeal to professional values, such as truth or 
integrity, can serve to establish trust that a particular actor or organization will serve the 
interests of a client or wider society above more narrow self-interests (Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005). Similarly, accounts can also serve to de-legitimise and de-institutionalise 
previously accepted practices by undermining the trust that we place in them (Vaara & 
Tienari, 2008; Maguire & Phillips, 2008; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Hardy et al. 1998). More 
specifically, we draw on McInerney’s (2008) approach to studying the role of accounts in 
problematizing, or justifying, the arrangements prevailing in an established institutional 
field. Our approach can best be described as abductive:  we build on existing theory 
(deduction), but at the same time we are strongly guided by the data (induction). Thus, 
during the period of data analysis and writing a first draft, there is a “constantly going ‘back 
and forth’ from one type of research activity to another and between empirical observations 
and theory” (Dubois & Gadde, 2002: 555).  
The analysis was conducted as follows. Each of the three authors independently 
read the publicly available transcript of the testimony given by the senior UK partners of the 
Big Four on the 23rd November 2010, noting in particular the way in which trust in the expert 
system of audit was problematized or repaired by the questioners (Lords) and respondents 
(Big Four). In addition to this, as part of the revision of this paper an interview was 
conducted with a former MP, who had served as a Chair of a Select Committee.   
 
Trust Problematisation 
Deductively speaking, i.e. in light of what the literature says, given the multi-faceted nature 
of trust (Mayer et al., 1995/2006: Table 1), it is important to distinguish between the 
trustor’s belief in the respective competence, benevolence and integrity of another party 
(Gillespie et. al., 2012; Mayer, et. al., 1995/2006). Inductively speaking, our analysis shows 
that trust was problematized by the Committee members along two dimensions, namely 
integrity and competence. Thus, in way of performing abduction, we propose that 
benevolence did not form part of the trust problematisation process, indicating that auditors 
need to be perceived as competent and not (excessively) self-interested or dishonest, but 
not necessarily ‘kind-hearted’ or ‘charitable’, in order to be trusted (Neu, 1991: 296).   
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Integrity 
Relationships of exchange place the trustee in a position of vulnerability, where the 
potential for self-interested exploitation is possible (Frowe, 2005: 43). Integrity relates to 
perceptions that a party (individual or collective) will not exploit the other party in pursuit of 
self-interest. Two integrity issues were problematized by the Lords in their questioning of 
the Big Four, namely competition and conflicts of interest. The Big Four were firstly charged 
with anti-competitive, protectionist behaviour designed to maintain or extend their 
oligopolistic position: “nearly almost all the audits in the FTSE 100 are now carried out by the 
Big Four and most of them in the FTSE 250.” (Chairman of Select Committee on Economic 
Affairs, Lord MacGregor) This questioner also raised the issue about the potential impact of 
one firm withdrawing, “since you are only four, any threat to withdraw could be said to be 
an abuse of a statutorily privileged position?” Indeed, if “the switching rates for a FTSE 100 
company are every 48 years; for a FTSE 250, every 36 years and for all listed companies, 
every 25 years. How can you possibly argue with a 4% churn every year that that’s a 
competitive market?” (Lord Forsyth)  
Secondly, the Big Four were also questioned about potential conflicts of interest 
relating to consultancy and advice services to clients they also audited: “Is there not a 
conflict of interest though at the heart of this because you’re providing advisory services, let 
us say, on taxation and tax planning, which is a major part of the professional services you 
supply, and then another group from your firm come along and audit the same thing?” (Lord 
Hollick) The charge here was that the Big Four exploited their position of power as an 
oligopoly and placed their self-interest in profit above their duty to investors and the wider 
public – thus undermining the trust that society places in auditors to produce fair, accurate 
and honest assessments of the financial state of audited companies.  
 
---- Insert Table 2 around here ---- 
    
Table 2 summarizes the four main points raised by the questioners, which 
problematized the trustworthiness of the Big Four with regard to integrity. We focus on 
these points because they potentially serve to undermine the credibility of the Big Four’s 
accounts and, thereby, pose questions around the trust in the expert system of audit. A 
detailed analysis of ‘trust problematization’ strategies with regard to competence is outlined 
in the next section.  
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Competence 
Competence relates to perceptions that a party (individual or collective) has the required 
skills, knowledge and experience to deliver on a promise or fulfil a task (Barber, 1983: 14). 
Thus, a trustor could have high levels of trust in the integrity and benevolence of the trustee, 
but because of their belief that the trustee cannot competently execute their side of the 
bargain, would not enter into a relationship. For example, the trust required to feel 
confident about air travel relies not only on trusting the integrity (and much less 
benevolence) of the pilots, air traffic controllers and aeroplane manufacturer and 
maintenance crew, but most importantly on trusting their competence derived from 
qualifications, training and experience (Gillespie et. al., 2012; Frowe, 2005: 35-37; Sztompka, 
1999: 52).  
Competence-based trust was problematized by the Lords in their interrogation of 
the Big Four with regard to two issues, namely practices of information 
exchange/representation and auditing standards. The Big Four were charged with failing to 
communicate important information with investors and failing to have proper dialogue with 
regulators, in particular around risky financial products they audited in the banks. 
Specifically, Lord Lawson questioned why the auditors “didn’t say anything to the regulators 
at that time”, when concerns about risk and leverage within banks were first coming to light. 
Questions were also raised about alleged failings to maintain proper prudence in their audit 
judgements of the banks in particular: “do you think IFRS accounting standards led bank 
auditors to a tick-box approach instead of scepticism and prudent judgement on client banks 
as going concerns?” (Lord Forsyth) 
 
---- Insert Table 3 around here ---- 
    
Table 3 summarizes the allegations with regard to five problematic practices raised 
by the questioners, which problematized the trustworthiness of the Big Four with regard to 
their espoused competence.  
Thus, in summary, the problematisations voiced by the Lords serve to combine the 
two core elements of competence and integrity: either the auditors failed to uncover or 
understand the financial risks being taken by the banks (e.g. high leverage, risky trading 
practices, poorly risk tested financial models) – a failure of competence; or the auditors did 
see the financial risks being taken by the banks and deliberately chose not to inform 
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investors or regulators to protect their commercial interest in maintaining their client 
relationship – a failure of integrity. A detailed analysis of trust repair strategies is outlined in 
the next section.  
 
 
Trust Repair 
The representatives of the Big Four used a variety of trust repair strategies. In terms of 
questions of integrity, our analysis has identified three main strategies used to attempt to 
repair trust - cosmological, higher values and legal compliance – which we will address in 
turn. First, the Big Four claim that the state of market concentration and low switching rates 
are the result of two natural forces and universal ‘cosmological’ laws: market forces and the 
forces of globalisation. Cosmological statements present the current state of affairs as the 
result of natural forces and universal laws (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Representatives 
of the Big Four claimed that “the degree of concentration in the audit market has arisen as a 
direct result of market forces” (John Connolly, Deloitte), that it “...is the natural order of 
events in our industry” (John Griffith-Jones, KPMG) and “...the result of market choice” (Ian 
Powell, PwC), also taking into account ““the natural tendencies to globalisation...” (John 
Griffith-Jones, KPMG).  By so doing, the Big Four attempt to restore trust by assuring the 
Committee, and the wider political system and general public, that the oligopoly is a result 
of client choice and their superior service, as opposed to self-interested protectionist 
behaviour aimed at restricting competition. Second, they (not surprisingly) appeal to higher 
values to present themselves as ‘above the fray’, as ‘above’ narrow self-interest, because of 
their professional commitment to ‘audit quality’: “So to be able to service clients that are 
very complex, that cover so many different territories, with real quality—and that is the 
ultimate focus of everything that we do, the quality of the audit...” (Ian Powell, PwC). This 
appeal to higher values – such as truth, knowledge, justice, society, public good, and so on – 
is a common feature of the discourse of professions (Freidson, 2001). Third and finally, the 
Big Four dismissed the notion that a conflict of interest does indeed exist between their 
auditing and consultancy services (such as tax planning advice) by stating that they ensure 
compliance with existing regulations: “… there are explicit rules already in existence that 
fundamentally say that you cannot audit your own work and there’s then a whole range of 
very specific exclusions … as a matter of fact, … in the last 12 months, no FTSE 100 company 
paid anything to their auditors for management consulting services.” (Mr John Connolly, 
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Deloitte) Thus, existing regulation is presented as sufficient to ensure that the audit industry 
can be trusted, without the need for additional intervention or regulation. 
 
---- Insert Table 4 around here ---- 
  
 
A more complex array of trust repair strategies was used to respond to the 
problematization of their competence. In addition to appeals to cosmological forces and 
higher values, the Big Four also made reference to institutionalised conventions and 
jurisdiction, and they utilized pledges and concessions. First, cosmological statements were 
employed to justify the use of arguably more ‘light touch’ or ‘tick box’ IFRS standards, which 
replaced the more prudent and sceptical UK GAAP standards. The change was attributed to 
changes in the business environment, such as the introduction of new financial products like 
derivatives. This presents the IFRS standards as a natural and perhaps inevitable evolution 
rather than, say, a self-interested or complicit move to ‘lighter touch’ audit standards. 
Second, higher values of ‘protecting the public interest’ were used to justify their (lack of) 
communication with shareholders. The Big Four justified their actions on the basis of 
needing to avoid giving market advantage to a select group of shareholders, thereby 
undermining their duty to act fairly and not privilege certain investors, along with practical 
considerations of how to secure meetings with inactive shareholders (see Fogarty et al., 
2009). Thus, while a lack of communication and information exchange is recognised by the 
Big Four, this is not seen to represent a fundamental breakdown in trust because it is a result 
of external factors outside their control, not a deliberate strategy of avoidance or dereliction 
of duty. 
Third, lack of regular communication and information exchange with shareholders 
and regulators was attributed to institutionalised conventions – the way things have always 
been done. This accounted for their actions in ways that mitigates the implications that such 
practices were a sign of incompetence (i.e. they failed to notice financial irregularities or 
high-risk investments) or lack of integrity (i.e. they did notice but sought to place commercial 
self-interests above public interest). Fourth, the problematisation of trust in their auditing of 
the banks in particular was handled through appeals to professional jurisdiction: what the 
job of the auditor is, versus what is outside their scope, such as assessing the viability and 
risk of the business model used by a firm. Fifth and finally, concessions and pledges were 
used to show that (a) they accept that some kind of transgression in trust had taken place, 
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(b) accept some (albeit limited) responsibility for their part therein, and (c) offer some 
attempt to heal the relationship through promises regarding future conduct: three 
important features of verbal accounts designed to repair trust (Lewicki & Polin, 2012). For 
example, Scott Halliday from Ernst & Young conceded that more needed to be done to 
improve dialogue, and pledged to improve practices in future: “If you look at the banking 
crisis, all four of us had meetings with the Bank of England around trying to improve the 
dialogue between the Bank of England and the firms. I think there’s more that can be done 
in that area including … more of a dialogue going both ways with auditor and the 
regulators.” Concessions were also made that the standards of audit had slipped and 
traditional prudence of judgement had been lost, and pledges to improve communication 
and information exchange with regulators and shareholders were made.  
 
---- Insert Table 5 around here ---- 
 
In summary, the representatives of the Big Four used a variety of trust repair 
strategies. They are illustrated by typical quotes in preceding Tables 4 and 5. We shall now 
discuss the ‘official report’ and efforts undertaken towards structural reform. 
 
 
The Official Report and Structural Reform 
Our analysis above focuses on the problematization of trust by the Lords in their 
interrogation of the Big Four. Testimonies given to the other hearings within the Inquiry - 
regulators, professional bodies, academics - yielded considerable disagreement about 
whether trust had, in fact, broken down due to a failure in integrity and competence. Some 
witnesses – notably the academic witnesses – provided a critical analysis of regulations 
(“What we lost in that process of moving to IFRS for UK-listed companies was the true and 
fair view, the prudence principle and the principle of substance over form”, Prof Beattie) and 
market structure (“it is not a market at all, in the sense that there are not willing buyers in 
which one ordinarily thinks of markets. There are enforced buyers by statute …”, Prof 
Power) which displaced a focus on individual firms in favour of broader regulatory issues. 
Others, the professional bodies for instance, vehemently denied that any breach or 
breakdown in trust (especially with regard to the competence dimension) had occurred: “we 
believe that audit itself is fit for purpose in terms of the review of financial statements”, 
(Tilley, CIMA); “there is plenty of evidence that we can bring forward to say that the audit 
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market delivering good outcomes happens but that is not grounds for being complacent” 
(Hodgkinson, ICAEW). Representatives from smaller consultancy firms similarly defended the 
status quo: “So what we have now is a system that works quite well. It suits the audit firms, 
it suits the management and it usually gets the right answer…” (Hayward, ‘Independent 
Audit’). In contrast, representatives of the medium-sized audit firms (Mazars, Grant 
Thornton, BDO, and RSM Tenon) warned that “in the event that one of the Big Four were to 
exit the market, there is a risk of systemic failure in the market” (Michaels, BDO). Because 70 
% of FTSE 100 companies have not had an audit tender for 15 years, “it is currently a very 
stagnant market ... no matter which capability you have, you just don’t have the opportunity 
of showcasing it” (Herbinet, Mazars). Similarly, the Chairman of the Office of Fair Trading 
acknowledged that “...competition in the market for audit services to large companies may 
be limited, as a result of barriers to entry and expansion, switching costs and limiting choice 
in firms” (Collins). During the session for the Representatives of FTSE 250 firms, it was 
pointed out that “...the apparent falling away of the dialogue between the audit firms and 
the regulator” (Roberts, Finance Director, British Land) has been a negative development. By 
drawing on a fairly comprehensive range of witnesses with varying claims to credibility, 
whether based on academic expertise, practical experience or senior position, the inquiry 
aimed to strengthen the authority of the process that would lead to the final report; and 
thus, by implication, increase the likelihood that the text, i.e. the final report, will “be 
received as authoritative.” (Brown, 2004: 96) What counts is not what the various parties 
claim in their accounts, but rather what version gets constructed in the final official report 
produced by the Lords, and indeed what changes followed this report. Following Brown 
(2004: 96), “inquiry reports are particularly interesting attempts to present a univocal and 
coherent view on what are generally readily acknowledged in the reports themselves to be 
complex and uncertain events.” Whilst the process of construction is necessarily contested, 
multi-vocal and fragmented, the outcome is presented as univocal, broadly uncontested and 
cogent. A singular voice of one author, even where a plurality of authors were in fact at 
work, is a necessary fiction for inquiry reports.  
The official report concluded that auditing is an oligopoly, thus it lacks adequate 
competition and protection against the self-interested behaviour of the Big Four; 
furthermore, the Big Four failed in their duty to protect the interests of the investment 
community and wider public at large, and recommended that a range of interventions were 
necessary in order to restore trust. Of course, the participants themselves knew full well that 
issues of trust and legitimacy were at stake in such a public inquiry process – as 
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demonstrated by The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants’ (ACCA) extensive letter 
to the Auditing Practice Board5. While it is clear that the Inquiry process itself represented 
an attempt to transfer trust from the political system to the audit industry, through the 
highly ritualised and ceremonial display of ‘accountability’ (Power, 1997; Shore & Wright, 
2000: 83-84; also Miller & Rose, 2008: 212), trust had not been fully restored through this 
process alone. Indeed, the continued presence of dis-trust is evidenced in the repeated calls 
for greater regulation, improvements in auditing standards and, above all, the referral of the 
audit industry to the Competition Commission for investigation6. The Competition 
Commission delivered a provisional report in the summer of 20137; the report is noteworthy 
as it is critical of the audit market as currently configured. The Commission made a number 
of recommendations that can be read as trying to repair trust in the expert system of audit: 
(i) FTSE350 firms should put their audit out to tender at least every five years; (ii) Financial 
Reporting Council should audit each audit engagement at least every five years; (iii) 
Prohibition of Big Four clauses in loan agreements that compels a company to use one of the 
Big Four; (iv) strengthening the power of the audit committee in firms.  
   These recommendations evince a certain level of distrust in the audit market. The 
measures suggested are very much directed at repairing trust in the current audit market; 
they stop short of a more fundamental shake-up or break-up, such as a move to replace the 
Big Four with a state-run institution. However, a break-up may also be initiated by the 
European Commission under competition rules8. In 2012, the European Commission 
released a briefing document suggesting that audit firms should be restricted to the 
provision of ‘audit only’ in the EU, that audit firms should not sell other services to clients, 
and that there should be mandatory rotation of auditors every six years.  The European 
proposals extend far beyond those of the UK Competition Commission. One conclusion is 
that commercial interests were not viewed as fundamentally incompatible with trust in the 
audit expert system. It was not seen as a case of whether commercial firms can be trusted to 
be objective, fair and prudent in auditing, but rather what forms of oversight and regulation 
                                                          
5
 http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/APB/Consultation-on-audit-firms-providing-non-audit-
se/Responses-to-Consultation-on-audit-firms-providing/ACCA.aspx 
6
 “Big Four Audit Tenders benefit from ‘virtuous circle’”, Accountancy Age, 01/10/2012.  
http://www.accountancyage.com/aa/news/2213523/big-four-audit-tenders-benefit-from-virtuous-circle.  
7
 http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/media-centre/latest-news/2013/jul/cc-outlines-
measures-for-audit-market 
8
 “Michel Barnier moves forward to break up Big Four Audit Firms”, Daily Telegraph, 29 November 2011. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/supportservices/8924093/Michel-Barnier-moves-forward-to-
break-up-Big-Four-audit-firms.html 
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are necessary to ensure that they maintain these standards and do not exploit their 
oligopolistic privileges.   
 
Discussion 
In this paper we argue that inquiries, commissions and committees “render the 
actions and judgments of professionals governable in new ways” (Miller and Rose, 2008: 
109), and are a means of governing organizations and enforcing accountability. It is a feature 
and is forming a part within a broader picture of distributed public governance in the U.K. 
(Flinders, 2004). A failure to maintain trust in the expert system of audit could lead to new 
forms of state intervention in the field (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012: 76), such as a prohibition 
of certain activities (such as consulting services), an enforced break-up of the oligopoly, or 
enforced joint audit, following the example of countries like France.  We argue that whether 
such outcomes are seriously considered or not arises from the performative effects of the 
interrogative rituals of the inquiry. For example, the Lords constantly questioned the 
premise of the Big Four’s standard operating practices, frequently expressing their 
incredulity at some of the established practices. At a minimum, an inquiry might simply 
amount to an institutionalised ritualised display of holding-someone-to-account that signals 
to society that something is being done even if, actually, actions are modest and fairly 
ineffectual (Meyer & Rowan, 1983; Brown, 2005). By taking this argument a step further, 
some have argued that public inquiries are therefore little more than a ‘smokescreen’, a 
veneer of accountability enabling the established power relations and lines of influence 
between business and politics to remain unchanged (Engelen, et al., 2012; Froud et al., 
2012). Our own analysis is differs from this view in that we propose to connect Miller and 
Rose’s theory of governmentality with Sztompka’s (1999: 46-51) theory of transfer of 
(dis)trust: we argue that ‘agencies of accountability’ which exemplify institutionalized trust 
(ibid. p.46), such as the Lord’s Economic Affairs Select Committee in our case, could help 
replenish the diminished trust experienced by the Big Four.  
Following Gillespie et al’s (2012: 191) typology, comprising (a) apology, (b) denial, (c) 
excuse/justification and (d) reticence, the trust repair tactics of the Big Four can be classified 
as a combination of ‘denial’ and ‘excuse/justification’. Gillespie et al. (2012: 191) claim that 
denials are typically effective where the violator is innocent, but that denials are ineffective 
where the violator is guilty of the trust violation. Our study takes the perspective that we 
can only view these matters through a veil of ignorance, which means that we can only study 
the role of denials and excuses/justifications in the interactional process through which 
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‘guilt’ or ‘innocence’ is discursively established in the course of an investigation. In our study,  
the deployment of denial and excuses/justifications seemed largely ineffective at shaping 
the official version of what  is wrong with the audit industry and whether they are to be 
trusted to continue ‘business as usual’. We propose that it is not the use of denial or 
justification/excuses per se, but rather how plausible and convincing they discursively 
appear to powerful institutional actors, such as political representatives, members of a 
public inquiry or regulators, that shape whether or not a violator is deemed guilty of a 
breach of trust. A key insight from our paper is that it is important for trust research to focus 
on the role of accounts in field-configuring events such as public inquiries (McInerney, 2008; 
Kramer, 2012; Gillespie et al., 2012) in ways that bridge the study of situated accounts at the 
micro level, and systems of institutional reform at the meso and macro level. In our case, the 
Big Four’s attempts to repair trust were largely unsuccessful; consequently, a package of 
measures aimed at reform has been recommended in order to restore trust in the expert 
system of audit.  
In addition, an important nuance also emerges from our study: we suggest that 
explicit recognition of violation or transgression, coupled with direct apologies and 
expressions of regret, guilt or blame, do not serve to restore trust in expert systems, but 
instead further undermine trust.  For instance, admission of a failure in duty and lack of 
objectivity due to commercial interests would not only have opened the Big Four to 
potential litigation or criminal prosecution, but would have also intensified the dis-trust of 
the expert system of audit. In the case of expert systems, therefore, we argue that trust 
‘violators’ have to strike a balance between showing humility and/or regret, accompanied 
perhaps by pledges of future trustworthiness, without directly admitting fault, liability and 
blame. If auditors admitted failings in uncovering fraud or risk (competence) or failings in 
reporting them to investors or regulators for fear of damaging their client relationship 
(integrity), the entire audit expert system would have been at risk of a more severe 
breakdown in trust. In our case, strategies of appeal to higher professional values, legal 
compliance and cosmological forces (such as market forces, globalisation, and adaptation) 
played an important role in providing that balance. 
This point connects to one of the findings from our study, namely the predominance 
of repair strategies (namely cosmology, higher values, institutionalised conventions and 
jurisdiction), which do not accept that a violation or transgression of trust has taken place. 
Other, perhaps less frequent, repair strategies - concessions and pledges - are distinct in that 
they recognise a transgression of some kind, such that it warrants some kind of 
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acknowledgement of the breach in trust, admission of responsibility, and attempt to 
compensate, reassure or otherwise heal the relationship. This suggests that our study stands 
in contrast to other studies which show the importance of acknowledgements of 
transgression, admissions of responsibility, offer of penance, repentance or repair, requests 
for forgiveness and expression of remorse and contrition in trust repair (for example, Lewicki 
& Polin, 2012).  Apologies and admissions of responsibility were notably absent from the Big 
Four in our study.  
Our study has shown that it was only after a ritualistic display of ‘scrutiny’ and 
‘accountability’ through the thorough interrogation of accounts that trust repair through 
structural reform became possible. We propose that structural reform is crucially dependent 
on the production, interrogation and interpretation of (often competing) accounts to 
establish an ‘official’ and ‘authoritative’ version of what (if anything) is wrong and what (if 
anything) can be done to restore trust. Our study has shown that the testimonial accounts 
produced by the Big Four were largely discredited, disregarded or dismissed in the official 
report produced by the Committee (and the governmental response thereafter), who 
instead concluded that the audit market in its current form could not be trusted and 
structural reform was to be recommended. One might argue that by showing a critical 
approach with a willingness to challenge powerful industry incumbents, the report authors 
enhance their own credibility and, thus, the authority of the final report. 
 
Conclusion 
Audit has expanded into ever more regions of public and private life and pervaded our very 
way of thinking and reasoning about ourselves and those with whom we interact (Power, 
1997; Strathern, 2000). Audit is premised on a systematic distrust of companies, viewed as 
having a potential interest in manipulating their financial records; being able to trust 
companies is the hoped-for outcome of the audit system. Checking and certifying these 
financial records is one of the very ‘trust-regulation mechanisms’ that are designed to 
(re)assure trust in the financial system; for this assurance to operate effectively, the 
expertise and independence of auditors must itself be trusted. In short, an effective audit 
should produce trust and comfort for stakeholders relying on the verisimilitude of the 
company records.  Auditors can, however, only be trusted if they are believed to have (a) a 
certain body of expert knowledge that ensures their competence, (b) a commitment to 
higher professional values that ensure they themselves are not solely driven by self-interest, 
and (c) to be themselves “certified by a trusted agency.” (Zucker, 1986: 606) That the audit 
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industry is the subject of a political inquiry - in effect being ‘audited’ - is a manifestation of 
the widespread breakdown of this belief in the aftermath of the financial crisis (Gillespie et. 
al., 2012; Engelen, et al 2012; Davies, 2010). Our study has shown that the question of trust 
in both the competence and integrity of the audit industry in the UK has been played out in 
the course of a parliamentary inquiry led by the House of Lords Select Committee on 
Economic Affairs. 
Extant trust research primarily focuses on two distinct levels: the micro-level of trust 
within dyadic inter-personal relationships, cognitive processes and verbal accounts, and the 
macro-level of system-level and institutional trust (Gillespie et. al., 2012). Building on this 
work, we show how trust ‘travels’ (Currall & Inkpen, 2006: 236), across and between levels.  
Our study demonstrates that it was only through the situated accounts produced by a range 
of institutional actors at the hearings that the structural reforms recommended by the 
Inquiry could plausibly be put forward. Only by establishing what went wrong, and who or 
what was responsible, was the committee able to produce legitimate recommendations on 
structural reform. Building on Janoff-Bulman & Parker’s (2012) argument, we argue that 
trust can only be transferred from the political system to the audit expert system if political 
representatives are seen to be non-partisan, thus free of allegiance to commercial interests 
or specific outcomes. Our study therefore shows how the two dimensions – the micro-level 
of situated accounts, and the meso- and macro-level of legal, political and regulatory 
systems – are linked. 
More specifically, we illustrate how the re-establishment of trust operated through 
three stages: (a) public displays of trust problematisation (see Tables 2 and 3), (b) the 
production of an official report providing an ‘authoritative’ and ‘objective’ view of the 
trustworthiness of the industry and profession, promulgating an official evaluation of the 
trust repair strategies employed by the ‘violators’ (see Tables 4 and 5), and (c) the 
translation of this document into legislative and regulatory changes.9 Before trust 
restoration mechanisms can be put in place, inquiries have to ensure that, (a) a violation of 
trust has actually occurred, (b) the violators are identified, and (c) the violators are 
interrogated with adequate scepticism to establish what went wrong. The four strategies we 
have identified, which sought to problematize both the integrity and competence of the Big 
Four through interrogation of the industry’s competition, conflicts of interest, practices of 
information exchange and representation, and auditing standards (see Tables 2 and 3), 
contribute towards theorising how trust problematisation takes place in the setting of a 
                                                          
9
 We have drawn up tables summarising these developments. These have not been included due to space 
constraints but we are happy to make them available upon request. 
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public inquiry. As we discussed earlier in this paper, the limitation of our approach is that 
our paper needs to be assessed in way of its plausibility and theoretical validity, rather than 
with regard to the concept of external validity (or generalizability), as it is far from 
straightforward to demonstrate how this inquiry, or this hearing within the inquiry, are 
typical or representative of developments more broadly.  
In addition, our findings help us understand some of the distinctive features of the 
maintenance of trust in professions, such as audit. In other industries, anti-competitive 
behaviour and selling on additional services may be similarly illegitimate according to 
socially defined norms of ‘fair play’ and ‘objectivity’ but, crucially, would not result in a 
fundamental breakdown of trust in the organizations themselves. Undertaken by a retail 
firm, say, such behaviour would not be socially sanctioned, but would also not unilaterally 
undermine consumer confidence in the firm’s products or services. Nor would it be likely to 
spark a parliamentary inquiry. Should trust in the competence of auditors to produce an 
accurate and prudent assessment of the financial health of a company be undermined, on 
the other hand, investment decisions and markets run the risk of de-stabilisation. Indeed, to 
be seen as merely ‘rubber stamping’ - having their judgement coloured by their self-
interested need to maintain the client relationship (Turley, 2008: 213) or avoid litigation – 
might well fundamentally undermine trust in the judgement of the auditors.  
Finally, our study suggests that trust research can be advanced by studying the 
processes through which specific behaviours, actions or events become associated with trust 
(Elsbach, 2004; Roberts, 2001; Powell, 1996), thus contributing to “a better understanding of 
the antecedents and consequences of trust in contemporary organizational contexts” 
(Kramer & Cook, 2004: 2-3). In many cases, behaviours are unambiguously associated with a 
breach of trust, such as fraud in the case of financial relationships. Yet, as studies of trust 
across generations (Davis et. al., 2012) and across nations (Bohnet, et. al., 2012) have 
shown, there exists considerable diversity in different individual and collective perceptions 
of what is deemed ‘untrustworthy behaviour’ and what would count as betrayal (Robinson 
et al., 2004). The decision to create a cross-partisan political inquiry into auditors in the UK, 
but not in other European countries or indeed in the U.S., also highlights this point. We will 
discuss the issue of national differences in more detail in the next section. 
Our study also contributes another dimension, namely the way in which external 
events play an important role in transforming previously accepted behaviour. In the case of 
the audit industry, the range of behaviours problematized by the Inquiry – including low 
switching rates, oligopolistic domination by four major players, infrequent meetings with 
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shareholders and regulators, and use of IFRS standards – has long been in place without 
being seen as an indication that auditors were less than trustworthy. Indeed, Chandler & 
Edwards (1996) have shown that auditor independence, competition between auditors, and 
audit regulation were discussed as early as 1896 as potentially problematic issues. The 
financial crisis clearly acted as a decisive event which shifted perception amongst key 
institutional actors including the government and the regulators, framing the current state 
of affairs as inadequate. Our study therefore has strong resonance with the wider critique of 
professions as ‘cartels’ who use idealized versions of themselves as masters of a unique 
codified body of knowledge, who adhere to higher professional values or ideals (truth, 
justice, public good) as a façade to hide the monopolistic protection of commercial interests 
(Reed, 1996; Freidson, 2001). Our study contributes to how such problematisations are 
accomplished in situ, by whom, and to what effect in relation to the potential repair of trust. 
Our conclusion is therefore not that auditors have breached trust in their integrity and 
competence through protectionist, self-interested behaviour, but rather that what matters 
most is whether in the opinion of authoritative institutions (such as parliamentary bodies) 
they have  broken the trust that society vests in them. 
 
Wider Theoretical Implications 
What are the wider implications of our analysis for theory development in terms of 
studies of expert systems, trust, and accountability? The point of departure for this paper is 
that while “the auditing profession has a vested interest in convincing users that 
accountants can be trusted” (Holm & Zaman, 2012: 59), the Inquiry is evidence that this 
trust has been problematized. Thus, “the institutional environment which determines the 
quality of interactions between firms” (Bachmann, 2001/6: 452) has become problematic in 
its ability “to generate shared economic, technical, cultural and social knowledge and to 
produce collectively accepted norms of business behaviour.” (ibid) What had been the basis 
of normality for the institution of Audit to function has now become the basis for asking: can 
we still afford our normal trusting attitude vis-à-vis audit? Major crises and scandals are 
interesting precisely because they typically lead to a shift in sensemaking about what is (or 
should) be accepted practice in a particular industry (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010). Our study 
contributes to the body of work that seeks to understand the role of trust problematisation 
and repair during major crises, failures and scandals by enabling us to learn lessons from 
such “negative deviants” (Kramer, 2012: 70), i.e. a major “public trust crisis” (Eilifsen & 
Willekens, 2008: 1). The challenge for future research into policy-making is to learn how to 
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ensure effective vigilance and scrutiny of expert systems before such major crises or 
scandals occur.  
A number of literatures shed light on our understanding of national differences  
regarding the institutionalisation (or lack thereof) of trust relationships: Doney et al. (1998: 
601) provide a more general conceptualization regarding “the ways national culture impacts 
the trust-building process.” From a socio-economics perspective, Harriss (2008), found a 
high degree of ‘selective trust’ in India, referring to trust “amongst groups of people within 
specific social networks” (ibid. p.320), arising when institutionalised sanctions and incentives 
are weak and law enforcement is poor. Child and Möllering (2003: 69) showed that in China 
“economic relations are strongly dependent on trust ...”. Trust in the German business 
environment is also judged to be high, but for very different reasons: industrial banking, with 
long-term loan arrangements between banks and companies are the institutional basis for 
“lasting and nurturing relationships of trust …” (Misztal, 1996: 215). The Varieties of 
Capitalism (VoC) literature has drawn comparisons between different national business 
environments and made the contrast between Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs), such 
as Germany, with Liberal Market Economies (LMEs), such as the UK and USA, (eg Hall & 
Soskice, 2001; Hall & Gingerich, 2009), but so far little is known about arrangements of 
auditor regulation and corporate governance (save for Vitols et al., 2001). Some have argued 
that supervisory board representation enjoyed by banks and insurance companies provides 
them with some insights into the internal financial affairs of the company in question and 
therefore makes them less dependent on the information provided by auditors (Köhler et 
al., 2008: 136). This structural position means that the German National Business System, for 
instance, is overall far less dependent on the checking functions of auditors which could be 
seen as a market solution appropriate in the ‘shareholder model of capitalism’ – perhaps, 
not surprisingly, there has been no equivalent parliamentary inquiry into auditor 
effectiveness in stakeholder capitalist Germany.  
One question worth exploring in future research therefore is whether CMEs are less 
dependent on external auditors than LMEs. Based on our analysis, we suggest that “legal 
norms and trust are more than compatible. In fact, legal regulation can foster the 
constitution of trust” (Bachmann, 2001/6: 451). According to Sitkin and Roth (1993/2006: 
298), existing literature “suggests that attempts to ‘remedy’ trust violations legalistically 
frequently fail because they paradoxically reduce the level of trust rather than reproducing 
trust.” Following Bachmann and Inkpen (2011), “(e)xtensive empirical research is needed to 
show whether our conceptual framework helps to fully understand why and how institutions 
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matter, where institutional-trust can stand in for interaction-based trust and vice versa.” We 
have addressed Bachmann and Inkpen’s (2011) call for research by showing how, during 
phases of problematisation and restoration, institution-based trust is dependent on the 
ritualised interrogation of accounts and production of official accounts. 
To our mind, audit’s ‘epistemic obscurity’ – to borrow a phrase from Power (1999) -  
is due to audit requiring both system and personal trust. This is reflected in the interactional 
dynamics at the testimony: when the partners are pushed to 'account for' why they have not 
reached a different assessment in their previous audits (for example, with regard to banks 
that subsequently failed and required state bail-outs), their answers make clear that for 
audit to function, both system and personal trust needs to apply. Audit opinions are largely 
rule-bound, but within a ‘grey zone’ they are also judgments that involve discretion and 
therefore cannot be fully accounted for with reference to a rule system. This is what Power 
(1997: 28) refers to as audit’s 'weak knowledge base': "there is no way of specifying the 
assurance production function independently of a practitioner's own qualitative opinion 
process". In this sense, audit is, like banking, a trust-intensive industry (Swedberg, 2010: 71). 
This is indeed a central point: audit is a judgment, which in itself can only partially be 
accounted for and, therefore, the way it was reached procedurally needs to be trusted. As 
Power (1997) argued "the epistemic foundation of financial auditing, i.e. the relation 
between its inputs and the production of assurance, is essentially obscure. Ultimately, 
financial auditing requires that the judgements of auditing experts are trusted." (ibid. 15) 
We therefore conclude that auditors are an expression both of our trust and our distrust. 
Hence, rival accounts to the Big Four’s account of ‘sound audit judgement’ are always 
potentially possible: lack of competition, conflicts of interest, absence of shareholder 
dialogue, lack of regulatory oversights, and so on – as evidenced by our analysis.  
We therefore argue that systemic or institutional trust is ultimately rooted in rituals 
of accountability at critical field-configuring events. The questioners in the inquiry we have 
analysed opened up for debate some of the institutionalised trusting actions vis-a-vis audit. 
Thus, trust in audit can be repaired only insofar as we still trust the political system of 
inquiries and their recommendations. For trust transfer to take place as a result of such 
inquiries, “it is necessary to craft institutional arrangements, which sustain and re-build trust 
as social capital.” (Misztal, 1996: 214) One could argue that increasingly we live not 
(primarily) in the ‘Audit Society’ but in the ‘Inquiry Society’ – inquiries are indeed 
everywhere: the UK has recently seen Inquiries into phone hacking by the Press, editorial 
lapses at the BBC, parliamentarians’ expenses, the LIBOR rate scandal, and so on. For us, 
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inquiries are a mechanism of transferring trust from one area of society where some amount 
of trust still exists (e.g. the legal framework or political oversight system) to where much less 
trust exists: many areas ranging from the banks, the Big Four, the newspapers, the BBC, 
politicians, parliament and so on. Trust transfer is thus potentially a crucial mechanism for 
the repair of damaged legitimacy.  
 
The Future of the Audit Industry 
It has long been held that legalized norms of procedural fairness, which underlie this like 
other inquiries, “are the sine qua non for society-wide ‘generalized trust’” (Cohen & Arato, 
1992: 27). Our ability to hold powerful privileged operators to account is the condition for 
our generalised ability to, under normalized conditions, be trusting and let them function (or 
get on with it). While this holding-to-account may soon be forgotten and a return to 
‘business as usual’ might follow, there is also the prospect of the scrutiny becoming much 
more intense and semi-permanent. This could play out in a number of ways: first, we may 
see more of the strategies used by the Big Four in this paper to repair trust with little or no 
substantive change to the institutional field; second, it might lead to legislation that changes 
the existing political-economic settlement that has been so favourable to the Big Four firms; 
third, it may open up a fissure between the UK and European Union institutions over the 
treatment of audit firms (Quick et al., 2008). There is of course nothing inevitable about any 
of these courses of actions, but the House of Lords inquiry certainly marks the start of a 
political-economic reformulation of the role and status of the Big Four. The Big Four audit 
firms will be far from passive in this process and will undoubtedly provide fascinating 
glimpses into their political power. Existing work by Anderson-Gough et al. (2000) and others 
(author reference, 2013) reveals the embedded nature of social relations that exist within an 
audit contract. In the world of familiar relations between audit partners and their clients, 
characterized by high levels of personal as well as system trust, a critical report from the 
House of Lords is likely to have little or no impact on this relationship. Outside of the UK, any 
impact between firms and their clients would be negligible.  
It is the impact on the policy world where the House of Lords report is likely to have 
its greatest impact. This is a world far removed from the personal relationships between 
audit firms and their clients, it is one that seeks to evaluate whether the current expert 
system of audit is indeed what that can be trusted.  There are a number of reasons why the 
House of Lords report stands the possibility of being influential in the long-term: (a) The 
subject matter was highly topical and resonated with concerns being expressed in Western 
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Europe and in North America; (b) Members of the committee are highly regarded within the 
world financial infrastructure and, consequently, they have an ‘authority to speak’; and (c) It 
is a report written from within the Parliament housed in one of the three leading world cities 
(Sassen, 2013) and one of the world’s leading financial centres. Perhaps the greatest reason 
that a critique by the House of Lords on the expert system of audit in the UK is likely to be 
far-reaching is because accounting is highly standardized as a profession internationally. In 
fact, accounting could be considered to be the quintessential global profession. 
Standardization has occurred through the widespread diffusion of International Financial 
Reporting Standards, in addition to the global dominance of the Big Four accounting firms. 
The corollary of this is that a critique of one context (the UK audit system) is likely to apply 
to other contexts because of the high levels of standardization and market concentration.  
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APPENDIX  
 
Questioners 
Lord McGregor of Pulham Market Conservative Party peer.  
Lord Tugendhat Conservative Party peer.  
Lord Smith of Clifton Liberal Democrat peer.  
Lord Forsyth of Drumclean Conservative Party peer. 
Lord Hollick of Notting Hill  Labour Party peer. 
Lord Lawson of Blaby Conservative Party peer. 
Lord Levene of Portsoken Cross-bench peer. 
Lord Lipsey Labour Party peer.  
Lord Best of Godmanstone Cross-bench peer.  
Witnesses 
Scott Halliday  Managing Partner of Ernst & Young for the UK and Ireland.  
Ian Powell Chairman and Senior Partner, UK PWC.  
John Griffith-Jones Head of KPMG for the UK.  
John Connolly UK Senior Partner, Global Chairman Deloitte.  
 
Table 1 – List of participants in the House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs inquiry into “Auditors: Market Concentration 
and their Role”, 23
rd
 November 2010. 
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Problematisation 
of Integrity 
  
Category Specific Issue Illustrative excerpts 
Competition Lack of competition 
between audit firms 
 
Low switching rates 
 
Anti-competitive, 
protectionist behaviour 
“It’s been clear from a lot of the evidence that we’ve received that there is a great deal of concern about 
the present audit concentration in the Big Four and particularly, of course, if you look at the FTSE 100 or 
the FTSE 250, nearly almost all the audits in the FTSE 100 are now carried out by the Big Four and most 
of them in the FTSE 250.” 
(Chairman of Select Committee on Economic Affairs, Lord MacGregor) 
 
“How competitive can the large company audit market really be when it is so highly concentrated and 
tendering and switching rates are so very low?” 
(Lord Smith) 
 
“I must say I find it very difficult to take this argument that it’s really competitive when, according to their 
figures, which I see you’re not really disputing, the switching rates for a FTSE 100 company are every 48 
years; for a FTSE 250, every 36 years and for all listed companies, every 25 years. How can you possibly 
argue with a 4% churn every year that that’s a competitive market?” 
(Lord Forsyth) 
 
“Then to come to my own question; the ABI wrote, and I do emphasise it was the ABI in 2006, “We are not 
comfortable with a position where large firms could determine the shape of regulation by threatening to 
withdraw from the  
audit market”. Obviously they feel that you do threaten, or you did threaten, to withdraw from the audit 
market. Do you regard that, first of all, as a reasonable assessment and secondly, would you agree that 
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since you are only four, any threat to withdraw could be said to be an abuse of a statutorily privileged 
position?” 
(Chairman of Select Committee on Economic Affairs, Lord MacGregor) 
 
Conflicts of 
interest 
Offering consultancy 
services, such as tax 
advice, to audit client 
“Is there not a conflict of interest though at the heart of this because you’re providing advisory services, let 
us say, on taxation and tax planning, which is a major part of the professional services you supply, and 
then another group from your firm come along and audit the same thing?” 
(Lord Hollick) 
 
“I think I heard you say that it’s only 10% of cases where you do internal audit or other consultancy type 
stuff for clients for whom you are the external auditor. ...  
So, in fact, since this is so small for you, all this stuff, it wouldn’t be of any great concern for you if that 
were prohibited.” 
(Lord Lawson) 
 
Table 2 – Problematisations of trust (integrity) in audit market by questioners vis-a-vis heads of Big Four, House of Lords Select Committee, 23
rd
 
November 2010. 
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Problematisation 
of Competence 
  
Category Specific Issue Illustrative excerpts 
Practices of 
information 
exchange and 
representation 
Lack of interaction with 
shareholders/investors 
 
Failure to represent 
interests of 
shareholders/investors 
 
Lack of information 
exchange with State and 
regulators 
“In effect, the audits that you are doing are reports to the owners of the businesses, which are the 
shareholders. To what extent do you have a dialogue with large shareholders of the principal companies in 
the FTSE rather than just talking to the companies themselves?” 
(Lord Levene) 
 
“As Lord Lawson said, Northern Rock was financed on one side by hot money and on the other side was 
making some fairly adventurous loans or high-risk loans. At the time did it occur to the audit team—was 
there any discussion within your firm or other firms—that there was a danger in this model? It goes to the 
heart of the going-concern judgement; frankly, as an investor that is what we hang a great deal of faith on. 
That is the assurance that we are looking for.” 
(Lord Hollick) 
 
“I was the author, as you know, of the 1987 Banking Act and the provision for there to be a regular 
dialogue between auditors and regulators was something that I attached enormous importance to. To 
begin with, that happened. But, as you say, it slipped away; it stopped happening. Can you explain why?” 
(Lord Lawson) 
 
“I am still not clear, first of all, whether you thought that, as Mr Connolly says, it was perfectly all right 
because there would be a bail-out or whether you didn’t notice there was anything wrong or whether you 
did notice something wrong but you thought you shouldn’t say anything to the regulators. As far as I can 
make out you didn’t say anything to the regulators at that time.” 
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(Lord Lawson) 
 
Auditing 
standards 
Weakening of audit 
standards 
 
Failure in auditing of 
banks 
“The question really is: do you think IFRS accounting standards led bank auditors to a tick-box approach 
instead of scepticism and prudent judgement on client banks as going concerns? The argument is that 
under the old UK GAAP system there was a degree of prudential judgement required and that the effect of 
IFRS has been to mean that you could say, “Well, we’ve done the audit but we haven’t looked beyond it”; 
exactly the discussion we’ve had.” 
(Lord Forsyth) 
 
“I am interested in the specific point that IFRS introduced a box-ticking culture rather than the old 
requirement to take a prudential view and also, for example, it’s been suggested that IFRS meant that the 
banks could delay recording actual losses while booking paper profits. There are specific criticisms of the 
rules but the broad philosophical attack is that we’ve moved to a box-ticking practice rather than a 
judgement and that is what most people would expect from an audit.” 
(Lord Forsyth)  
 
“Would you agree that by about the middle of 2007—and I am talking about the banks now—the writing 
was sufficiently on the wall about the global financial crisis for auditors to have sounded serious notes of 
caution well before their report on the 2008 year-end statements? Was this a failure of the audit and, if 
there are lessons learned from that, what changes are going to be made to try to avoid it in the future?” 
(Lord Levene) 
 
“Are you saying that, looking at the position, you thought that the bank was likely to be in trouble but you 
couldn’t possibly say that because that might precipitate the crisis and, therefore, by giving assurance you 
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took the view that the accounts were okay?” 
(Lord Forsyth) 
 
“I’m a naïve amateur in this field but I expect “going concern” to mean that a business can pay its debts as 
they fall due, but you meant something quite different. You meant the Government will dip into its pockets 
and give the company the money and then it can pay its debts as they fall due and you gave an 
unqualified audit report on that basis. If you had said, “We are satisfied that support will be available from 
Government that will enable it to continue as a going concern”, of course you wouldn’t be subject to this 
criticism. But instead, where your duty is to report to investors the true state of the company, you were 
giving a statement that was deliberately designed to mislead markets and investors as to the true state of 
those banks. That seems to me to be a very strange thing for an auditor to do.” 
(Lord Lispey) 
Table 3 – Problematisations of trust (competence) in audit market by questioners vis-a-vis heads of Big Four, House of Lords Select Committee, 
23
rd
 November 2010. 
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Repair 
of Integrity 
  
Category Specific Strategy Illustrative excerpts 
Competition Cosmological (e.g. market forces) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Higher values (e.g. audit quality, 
professionalism) 
 
“The degree of concentration in the audit market has arisen as a direct  
result of market forces” 
Mr John Connolly, [Deloitte] 
 
“...is the natural order of events in our industry” 
Mr John Griffith-Jones, [KPMG] 
 
“...the concentration that’s there is the result of market choice” 
Mr Ian Powell, [PwC] 
 
“I think the natural tendencies to globalisation...” 
Mr John Griffith-Jones, [KPMG] 
 
“...competition and choice in the market is vital but this must not be at the 
expense of quality, which really is so essential to the proper workings of the 
global capital markets and financial stability.” 
Mr John Connolly, [Deloitte] 
 
“...to accelerate the globalisation of our firm they really had two main drivers. 
One is what the market was asking for, to be able to serve them on a seamless, 
consistent and cross-border basis, but also at the heart of it was to improve the 
quality of the audits that we would execute.”  
Mr Scott Halliday, [Ernst & Young] 
 
“...to break up the firms would restrict the amount of investment monies that 
would be available in order to continuously improve the quality of the audit 
service and to serve increasingly complex and multi-national organisations.” 
Mr Ian Powell, [PwC] 
 
“...competition and choice in the market is vital but this must not be at the 
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 expense of quality, which really is so essential to the proper workings of the 
global capital markets and financial stability.” 
Mr John Connolly, [Deloitte] 
 
“So to be able to service clients that are very complex, that cover so many 
different territories, with real quality—and that is the ultimate focus of everything 
that we do, the quality of the audit—then I think you do need this sort of scale of 
operation to be able to make that investment.” 
Mr Ian Powell, [PwC] 
Conflicts of 
interest 
Legal compliance and higher 
values (e.g. professionalism, 
integrity) 
Lord Hollick: “...Doesn’t that present you with a real conflict of interest?” 
Mr Ian Powell [PwC]: “No because the independence rules are very strict on 
this. They’re reviewed by the audit committees; they’re reviewed by ourselves in 
terms of the provision of those services. We would not put ourselves into a 
situation where we had to audit a work that was undertaken by the firm in a 
different way.” 
 
“If we are the auditors of an organisation, if we review, let’s say, a piece of tax 
planning and say, “We can’t do that piece of work because we would bring 
ourselves into a conflict situation”, that piece of tax work would be done by 
someone else. That piece of work wouldn’t be let by the company; it wouldn’t be 
let by the audit committee and we wouldn’t take it anyway.” 
Mr Ian Powell, [PwC] 
 
“I think this is the point because there are explicit rules already in existence that 
fundamentally say that you cannot audit your own work and there’s then a whole 
range of very specific exclusions. To the point that Lord Lawson made, as a 
matter of fact, the APB’s recent paper, as I referred to earlier, did conclude that 
in the last 12 months, no FTSE 100 company paid anything to their auditors for 
management consulting services.” 
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Mr John Connolly, [Deloitte] 
 
Table 4 – Responses to problematisations of trust (repair of integrity) in audit market by representatives of Big Four, House of Lords Select 
Committee, 23
rd
 November 2010. 
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Repair 
of Competence 
  
Category Specific Strategy Illustrative excerpts 
Practices of 
information 
exchange and 
representation 
Institutionalised conventions  and 
practical considerations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Higher values (e.g. 
protecting/representing interests 
of investment community) 
 
 
 
 
 
Lord Levene: “To what extent do you have a dialogue with large shareholders 
of the principal companies in the FTSE rather than just talking to the companies 
themselves?” 
Mr Griffith-Jones [KPMG]: “At the moment, very rarely, if at all and that’s 
through convention and the way it is. The audit committee is taken to represent 
and act in the interests of the shareholders. The shareholders are not very 
active in coming to general meetings with our firms. We offer to meet them on a 
general basis.” 
 
“The issue of meeting on a specific client is clearly confidentiality because what 
they want to know is something of market advantage to themselves and clearly, 
unless you had all the shareholders in the room at the same time, to talk to one 
group of shareholders in advance of another and to give qualitative views on 
one’s clients would not fit comfortably into the rules in the way they are operated 
at the moment.” 
Mr John Griffith-Jones, [KPMG] 
 
 
Lord Levene: “Would you welcome the opportunity to have that dialogue [with 
investors]?”  
Mr Ian Powell [PwC]: “Yes, we do; very much.” 
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Pledges (e.g. to improve dialogue 
with regulators and shareholders) 
 
“If you look at the banking crisis, all four of us had meetings with the Bank of 
England around trying to improve the dialogue between the Bank of England 
and the firms. I think there’s more that can be done in that area including the 
use of—I think they are referred to as 166 reports in this country—and more of a 
dialogue going both ways with auditor and the regulators.” 
Mr Scott Halliday, [Ernst & Young] 
 
Auditing 
standards 
Higher values (e.g. honesty, 
integrity, true and fair judgement 
[at the time, without benefit of 
hindsight]) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Okay. Just to kick off on this one as well, ultimately accounting reflects a 
business. It’s not the other way round. So whichever accounting model that you 
go for, it’s going to have to reflect exactly what happens.” 
Mr Ian Powell, [PwC] 
 
“I think when you look at the audits at the two-year end—so let’s look at 31 
December 2006—nobody could perceive the crisis that was coming. So on the 
assessment that was made at that point on the availability of liquidity, you have 
to assume that when you’re trying to form a view as regards the going-concern 
nature of an organisation, it’s not just going to run completely into a brick wall at 
some point during the next 12 months. You make an assumption, a realistic and 
educated assumption, as regards the market conditions—the way the market is 
likely to go.” 
Mr Ian Powell, [PwC] 
 
“It’s not the job of the auditor presently to look at the business model of a 
business. That is the job of management. It’s not the auditor’s job to give a view 
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Jurisdiction (i.e. role of auditor) 
 
 
 
 
 
Cosmological (e.g. adaptation to 
market forces)  
 
 
 
 
Pledges (e.g. need for review of 
IFRS, need for common global 
standards, need for change) 
 
 
 
 
as regards the actual model that is put together.” 
Mr Ian Powell, [PwC] 
 
 
“I think if you look back to UK GAAP say 10 years ago, obviously things needed 
to change. UK GAAP didn’t, for example, have a standard on "How do you 
account for derivatives?" So there were new businesses and new business 
models that were starting to be introduced.” 
Mr Ian Powell, [PwC] 
 
“I think one of the keys here is to get one consistent global accounting policy 
globally, one standard, and we believe that is IFRS—that IFRS should be 
applied consistently around the world. I also think it’s important to step back and 
challenge ourselves on the heels of this Committee and say there weren’t a lot 
of restatements or errors noted in valuation through this crisis. What can be 
done maybe to increase the financial reporting and the disclosures of these 
things? What needs to change in the financial reporting model in addition to get 
one globally consistent set of accounting policies?” 
Mr Scott Halliday, [Ernst & Young] 
 
“We will set out our views in writing on this as well but it’s pretty clear, given the 
depth of review that is ongoing by the standard setters at the moment as 
regards IFRS, that maybe things did go a bit too far and took out some of the 
judgement that should have been in there.” 
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Concession (e.g. standards may 
have slipped, prudence may have 
been lost) 
 
 
Mr Ian Powell, [PwC] 
Table 5 – Responses to problematisations of trust (repair of competence) in audit market by representatives of Big Four, House of Lords Select 
Committee, 23
rd
 November 2010. 
 
